Nations and empires stretching from the bitter north to the humid south have all tried their hand at conquering Afghanistan- a nation that is absolutely vital to any empire that wishes to dominate the middle east with its great trade route that once bought silk and now bring opium and its place at the heart of Russia, China, India, Iran and Pakistan- big world players. If you want to control the world, Afghanistan is a great place to start. However, after sending more than 100,000 troops, spending more than $822 billion and carrying out hundreds if not thousands of airstrikes, America is still no closer to getting rid of the Taliban. On 29 February 2020, the world looked on as the US signed an, “agreement for bringing peace,” to Afghanistan with the Taliban, where the US and NATO allies agreed to withdraw all troops within fourteen months if the militants guaranteed that Afghanistan would not become a hub for terrorist activity.
The nearly 20-year American combat mission was at its end. Did America accomplish what it set out to do in Afghanistan- strengthen the national government and train the Afghan forces to reduce support for the Taliban? Well, considering that the Taliban have seized three provincial capitals in a single day and there have been thousands of reports of Afghan fighters seeking refuge in other countries to avoid fighting- the obvious answer is no. Afghanistan and the Taliban proved too strong for the United States. So the question does arise, if the US, one of the most economically, militarily and politically powerful countries in the world couldn't beat the Taliban, then who can?
The years after 9/11 were some of the lowest that the Taliban had ever faced. Within a month, U.S. missiles began demolishing Taliban frontline positions and military camps with a pinpoint accuracy that shook the fighters. The Taliban were forced to abandon their posts and take cover in civilian buildings. They smeared mud over their trucks and cars in a vain attempt at camouflage, but it was no match for modern missiles. It took just over a month for the insurgents’ rule to collapse in the north and suddenly the Taliban were on the run.
By the end of 2001, the Taliban’s grand scheme to establish an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan had come to an ignominious end. The Taliban were surrendering all over the country- the only formal surrender of the forces in the war and the signal moment of their defeat. The Taliban had misjudged the strength of the American attack. They misread the strength of their standing with the Afghan population and expected the population to rally to their side in the event of an American attack. Just when the whole of Afghanistan was within reach, Taliban power evaporated, the Americans and the civilian government were in charge.
However, when the Taliban were hiding in cold caves and deserted mountains or seeking shelter in Pakistan like vagrants were they able to plan an insurgency that saw them wield power in Afghanistan a few years later? One of the reasons for the Taliban’s success comes from their large public support, even though this support decreased after 9/11, the years of living under foreigners, a corrupt and inefficient government and the added threat of airstrikes had left its mark of Afghans. They wanted the Taliban back in charge.
A third of the population had been forced to flee the country. An estimated one million people had died. A frustrated Afghan official once said to a journalist, “ If the British army would be allowed to bomb a house in Northern Ireland because it suspected an IRA gunman inside. Then why did it think it could do so in Afghanistan?” The airstrikes were not compatible with the threat, if you’re looking for one man you should use spies not bombs. Yet casualties did not stop until 2009, when General David Petraeus switched to a counterinsurgency campaign centered around protecting the civilian population. But it was too late, the deaths had left their mark on the Afghan public.
Another mistake was the corruption and inefficiency of the Afghanistan government. Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, decided not to fight strongmen and chose to tolerate the corruption that swelled in his administration. He undermined parliament to ensure that it did not become a base of opposition to him and instead placed ministers in power who he knew would not be a threat to his power or appease them and prevent them from becoming threats later on. For example, Karzai arranged the return of General Abdul Rashid Dostum, the most brutal of warlords to ensure support for the Uzbek and Turkman tribes. Karzai’s greatest failing had been that he had allowed some of the worst war criminals and mafia bosses back into power.
The Afghan people suffered massacres, disappearances, executions and aerial bombardments for thirty years. There was no advancement in human rights or justice since the American invasion and instead the Afghan were poor, hungry and more frustrated with their government than ever before - giving the Taliban the opening they needed for their return.
In 2015, the Taliban launched a series of suicide attacks, car bombings and other assaults, but they had the support of the majority of the Afghan public who were angry, hungry and tired. Taliban propaganda displayed the Karzai government as working with foreign powers and compared the American invasion to that of the USSR. Wherever, the met opposition the Taliban used force or threats, knowing that the police would not protect them, Afghans complied and from then on there has always been a presence of the Taliban in Afghanistan even during the American invasion.
Afghanistan is a complicated nation, governed primarily on interest. When it's in the interest of America to arm the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet Union they will. When it's in the interest of Pakistan to fund the Taliban they will. But if there’s one thing that this war has taught us is that no leader in the nation can rule without the support of the people. That is why the Taliban were run out of the country after 9/11 and that is why they rule the country today.
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